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NOTE TO THE READER
The immediacy of the events in the Soviet Union necessitated the use of
many current sources, particularly periodical and newspaper articles. The
volatile nature of the current political, economic, and social situations
demanded that I use these recent references over more authoritative
sources.

Great Russia has forged an indestructible union of free republics.....
First line of the Soviet national anthem

Prologue

These first few words of the national anthem of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics are very telling. That the Soviet state was indeed forged
together, at first by an overbearing empire and later by an greedy totalitarian
government, has become increasingly evident in recent years as the shroud of
secrecy covering the Soviet Union's enigmatic past has been lifted under a
program of democratization and other reforms.

It is also has become

apparent that the union is not as indestructible as initially believed. As we
can see by merely glancing at today's headlines, the Soviet Union is
experiencing grave internal disorder. The union's fifteen republics, which are
not really free after all, are tearing themselves away from each other and from
the central Soviet government, taking with them resources, land, and power,
which many nationalists feel was wrongly taken from them by the Russians.
Some of the republics were annexed under the tsarist regime, while others
were incorporated after the communists seized power in 1917. All, however,
share a common bond - they were forced into the union.
Because of this forcible annexation of lands, a powerful animosity
towards the central leadership developed within most of the annexed
republics. A bitter resentment, coupled with strong nationalist sentiment,
existed in some form in every non-Russian republic. However, the autocracy
and authoritarianism that existed up until the arrival of Gorbachev stifled
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and repressed nationalism. When Gorbachev entered office and introduced
his new reform program, these ethnic problems surfaced, creating a more
problematic situation than either the economic or political crises, both of
which have received far more attention from the American media.
My thesis rests on the notion that, because of the increase of freedoms
in the Soviet Union today, many republics are demanding that their
autonomy be restored and that this nationality crisis, an unforeseen and
unwanted byproduct of recent reforms, has grown into such a disaster that it
is now actually impairing the whole reform movement in the Soviet Union
as civil unrest and strife are beginning to threaten the stability of this huge
empire. Ethnic identity is not something that can be hidden, changed, forced,
or converted, nor will national and cultural roots simply disappear over time.
Thus, the coercive incorporation of different nationalities will result in
resistance and ultimately in revolt, but only if enough freedom and power
can be garnered and then organized by the oppressed peoples.
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms uncovered a lot more
than just economic and political structure problems. Unfortunately for him,
he realized this a little too late. Once out of the closet, nationality tensions
erupted all over the country. Originally, analysts asserted that the ethnicity
crisis evolved out of the . rapid changes and implementation of semi
democratic reforms, but upon a more careful examination of the situation, it
is evident that the nationality problem has existed since the revolution but
was merely well-hidden.

The closed nature of Soviet society before

Gorbachev allowed for these kinds of "secrets."
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As the crisis unfolded in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, it became
apparent that the hostility that existed between some republics and the central
Soviet government was precipitated by both a growing dissatisfaction with
the Soviet system and a new-found freedom to express this vexation.
The question of how to handle this domestic dilemma in the USSR,
the largest multiethnic nation in the world, has been the source of much
controversy since the introduction of Gorbachev's reform program.
Interethnic hostilities and discord have resulted in widespread disorder and
antagonism in Russia and the other fourteen Soviet republics. Thus, while
the USSR faces the monumental task of implementing perestroika - a virtual
economic and political facelift - it is being challenged by this other
overwhelming dilemma, popularly referred to as "the nationality question,"
which is gradually forcing the other reforms into the background. This recent
heightened awaresness of nationalism has given rise to many pro
independence, nationality movements, which in gaining a voice through

glasnost, perhaps the most important element of perestroika, are today crying
out almost in unison for independence. The question now is whether the
Soviet Union will be able to hold itself together. Can a leadership that is
steady losing its grip on society hold together a crumbling union?
One can easily see that these ethnic crises unleashed by Gorbachev's
reforms have revealed a fundamental flaw within the Soviet system.

The

central Russian power, in trying to forge many different nations into one
great society, but ignoring the ethnic and cultural diversity, has gotten itself
tangled up in a terrible dilemma. The leaders in the Kremlin must face up to
the facts that successful democratic reforms cannot coexist with oppression
and coercion of minority nationalities or any other group.
3

Moreover, the

Soviet leadership cannot hope to solve one problem without having to also
resolve the other. In other words, economic reform cannot be successfully
implemented without offering a solution to the problem of nationalism. The
political, economic, and social crises within the USSR are distinctly different
problems, but they are all interconnected. The Soviet Union cannot hope to
democratize their system while simultaneously denying the republics a right
that is granted to them under the Constitution. Thus, what lies ahead for the
Soviet Union must be calculated by looking into the development of this
national crisis and putting it into perspective in the framework of how it is
interwoven with other domestic problems in the USSR

4
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INTRODUcnON

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed in 1922 when the
Russian republic "merged" with the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and parts of the
Transcaucasus region. In later years, the Union continued to amass even
more territory by annexing several more states. In the late 1920s, Turkmenia,
Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikstan, all southern republics bordering Iran and
Afghanistan were added. Soviet Central Asia expanded its territory in the
middle of the 19305, when the Kirghiz SSR and Kazakh were annexed. A few
years later, in 1940, Moldavia and the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia) were forced into the union, bringing the number of soviet
socialist republics to a total of fifteen.

1

Today the USSR spans over eight

million square miles and consists of these same fifteen different republics
plus five autonomous regions, ten autonomous areas, and over one hundred
distinct nationality groups speaking in two hundred dialects and languages.
Although hardly a united nation, Soviet leaders since the time of its
conception have striven to establish a common identity within the union.
"Nationalist in form, socialist in content" was the image the Soviet
leadership sought to portray. However, in trying to create a single Soviet
identity by forging all of these different regions, religions, races, and ethnic
groups together into one, the leadership succeeded only in promoting
hostilities among these peoples and towards the central powers themselves.

lVadim Medish, The Soviet Union (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991) pp. 33-34.
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But only over the past six years were these angry republics able to voice their
animosity, after decades upon decades of repressed bitterness and
dissatisfaction. This project will examine why the USSR, after seventy years
of preservation, today faces possible disintegration. More specifically, the case
studies of the three Baltic republics and the Ukrainian republic, all of which
have strong, organized separatist movements, will be used to show how the
cohesion of the union is in jeopardy.

Differences in the struggle for

independence between the Ukraine, which was initially annexed into the
Union during imperial times, and the Baltic region, which was annexed
much more recently, during World War II, will also be highlighted. The
history of both regions will be examined in search of why the former is more
likely to stay in the union while the latter are more apt to secede. The
Ukraine and the Baltics have actively pursued independence over the past
year and a half and are both relatively successful and powerful regions. Yet
both may end up with distinctly different destinies. Why the Soviet Union
has failed to create a unified national identification throughout all of the
republics can be answered by looking into their recently uncovered past,
which, in turn, aids in the speculation of what the future may hold for this
precarious alliance.

Historical Perspective
Assessing the historical development of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the name by which it officially became known in 1922, is essential
to our overall understanding of the nature of the present national crisis.
Russia's political roots date back about eight hundred years.

6

In its first

hundred years, many battles were fought and lives were lost, but the Russians
managed to hold onto their territory.

In the Middle Ages, Russians had

gained enough manpower and strength to successfully fight off any invading
anny and even succeed in spreading westward into new territories that were
conquered with relative ease.

Indicative of their westward expansion,

Russians moved their capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg, present-day
Leningrad, in the sixteenth century. Out of new acquisitions, old territory,
and a tsarist form of government evolved the Great Russian Empire.
By the 1700s, Russia had annexed parts of Poland and today's Baltic
region and had begun moving into Transcaucasia and the Crimean
Peninsula. A century later, territorial acquisitions included all of the above
regions, Finland, parts of Central Asia, Armenia, and Ceorgia.s This drive for
territorial expansion was motivated by a combination of reasons. Surely the
euphoria of victorious conquests drove the Russians to continue in their
succession of foreign invasions, but an even stronger driving force was the
Russians' fear of being invaded themselves. Because of their own lack of
natural borders around their original territory, they had been repeatedly
invaded and feared that their empire might once again be snatched away
from them.

Thus, Russia began invading neighboring regions to build a

buffer zone and satisfy its perceived need for security. In short, territorial
expansion was justified as defending national interests. Under the tsarist
regime, based on an imperial legacy, sovereignty of a non-Russian territory
was disregarded, at best, and repressed, at worst.

2Medish, p. 11.
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After the Revolution of 1917 brought tsarist rule to an end, Lenin came
to power and sought to redefine the map of the former empire.

Along with

reforms of things such as the alphabet and the calendar, Lenin promised to
change the very nature of the union, granting freedom to all the republic
territories. However, almost as soon as it was granted, their freedom was
taken away again.

Some of the stronger areas on the fringes of the union

were able to break away, other smaller, more dependent republics were not so
lucky. Areas dominated by the Finns, Poles, and Balts were successful in their
drives to restore independence, many of the other republics were simply
"recaptured."
The need to create a unified Soviet state was used as justification for
this forced annexation of lands. The nationalism that existed in the nonRussian regions after the Revolution was viewed as incompatible with the
goals of the new communist government and thus was quelled.

Lenin

decried the struggle for self-determination by many ethnic groups, calling it
"unacceptable" and urged they all the annexed territories join their efforts to
create a unified state) In actuality, Lenin was endorsing the subordination of
these new regions to a centralized government which was completely
Russian." Ethnic identity were not only discounted, but was also repressed.
Thus, in forming the Soviet state, Lenin and the new Soviet constitution
ignored the continued cries for independence and insisted on forcing
harmony in the new union.

3Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soyjet Disunion - A History of the Nationalities Problem

in the

ll.S.SR (New York: The Free Press. 1990) pp. 23-24.
4Nahaylo and Swoboda, p. 26.
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Moreover, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, the development of
an international consciousness would eventually result in the disappearance
of nationalism. Socialism, it was thought, would create a single, unified state
in which all peoples would live harmoniously and cooperatively.

In

addition, the incorporation of non-Russian territories was seen as necessary
for the socialist cause. Marx, on the formation of the new Soviet state, said
that it was necessary to "impel the republics towards amalgamation" in order
to create "a reliable bulwark against international capitalism. itS

This also

served as justification for holding onto the republics which would ensure the
safety of the Soviet Union, as well as guarantee a wide scope of influence for
both Russia and socialism. The post-revolutionary leadership, first under the
direction of Lenin and later under Stalin, strictly enforced Soviet hegemony,
ignoring the distinct ethnic and cultural differences among different regions
that had been incorporated into the new Soviet state.

Today's Perspective
Independence movements and interethnic hostilies which, over the
past couple of years, have threatened to overshadow Soviet domestic reforms,
today seem to all but ensure their demise.

In trying to concentrate on

economic reforms and implement democratization, Gorbachev and his
colleagues have been distracted by commotion in the outlying republics,
commotion which now demands immediate attention before any of the other
problems. By the end of 1990, all of the union's fifteen republics had declared

5Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942) pp. 123
125.
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some sort of sovereignty from the union, and seven others, the Baltics states,
Armenia, Moldavia, Georgia and the Ukraine, have declared independence
altogether.
President Mikhail Gorbachev, realizing the gravity of this
unanticipated crisis, has vowed to resolve it.

Initially attempting to use

forceful measures to maintain unity, as was the case when interethnic
violence first surfaced in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1985, Gorbachev seemed
to have been moving away from this tactic in the late 1980s. Then in early
1990, he ordered Red Army tanks into Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, when
the republic declared its indepedence from Moscow. Unlike his other uses of
force, as in Kazakhstan and Georgia in the late 19805, when Gorbachev
claimed to have been trying to restore order, this display of Communist
might in Vilnius was an unambiguous message to nationalists to end their
attempts to break away.
Ironically, however, Gorbachev has recently been alternating between
use of force and power of negotiation. Since the middle of last year, he has
been entertaining the idea of a new treaty that would guarantee the republics
their sovereignty in exchange for a degree of submission to the central
authorities in Moscow. But instead of treaties and contracts, threats and
ultimatums have been made.

No promises have been made on paper,

however, and spoken promises have only included compromises deemed
mediocre and flawed by pro-independence republican leaders.
Today the leaders of the world's third most populous nation are
teetering on the edge of a gradually eroding cliff. The question, then, that
lingers on everyone lips is: Will the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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remained united, or will this seventy-year-old confederation come crumbling
down? The answer probably lies somewhere at the midpoint between these
two recourses. That Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues must soon provide the
anxious republics with more finite, unambiguous guidelines is evident.
What the specifics of these provisions, as well as their short- and long-term
effects, may prove to be is much less clear. As then Prime Minister Nikolai
Ryzkhov so aptly stated in September, 1990: "To be or not to be a united
government, that is the question."

International Significance
So what exactly does all the turmoil mean and what kind of
significance does it have on a world-wide level? The domestic crisis of the
Soviet Union is not only an international problem, but it is also a lasting
problem. Trying the straighten out the crises within the Soviet Union could
potentially take more than a generation's worth of time, if reforms are indeed
to be carried out at all. If conservative forces succeed in hindering reform,
then it could take even longer. The Soviets' internal problems will have
world-wide reverberations, especially if civil war breaks out.

Western

Europe, Great Britain, and the United States have already stated their
displeasure with the invasion of the Baltic republics, warnings could easily
grow into action taken by foreign countries if prompted. At the beginning of
1991, the European Communisty threatened to revoke a promise made earlier
to the Soviet Union for "$1 billion in food and economic aid and $500 million
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in technical assistance."6

The United States acted similarly in May of 1991

when they threatened to revoke a $1.5 billion aid package. In an interview
with a Warsaw newspaper, former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
warned that if the (Soviet Union's) situation could not be stabilized then "it
will pose a threat to.....the whole of Europe and the world. And unstable
Soviet union poses the highest danger. It is in the world's interest that the
situation in the Soviet Union should stabilize."?
Under Gorbachev and "new thinking," there has been a renewed
interest in increasing multilateral ties.

Under his economic and foreign

policy reforms, Gorbachev expressed a renewed interest in foreign
investment, a move which could ultimately strengthen the global economy.
Moreover, concrete steps toward disarmament, in the form of troop cutbacks,
base closings, and arms reduction have been taken by this former superpower
over the past few years.

Reform in the Soviet Union, if successful, could

mean the beginning of a new global relationships that could potentially
benefit the Soviet Union itself as well as other countries and the world
balance of power. Consequently, what happens inside Soviet borders is not
just their own business, but rather its problems carry grave implications for
the rest of the world. Thus, in additon to dominating domestic affairs, the
nationality question in the Soviet Union spans across international
boundaries.

6Bruce Nelan (a), "The Bad Old Days Again,"~, 28 January 1991: p.83.

7Daily Repon Soviet Union, 20 March 1991 "Shevardnadze: Dictatorship Warning Well Founded' "
(Washington, D.C.: FBIS-SQV-91-054) p.31.
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The manner in which the Soviet leadership deals with each republic
cannot be emphasized enough. For roughly four decades following World
War II, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated global politics in
their battle for dominance as the "more important" superpower.

This

relationship has changed significantly as a bi-polar world has gradually given
way to a multi-polar world and the rivalry has softened with the increased
cooperation between leaders. With the recent thawing of Cold War attitudes,
there has been a shift in the relationships among world powers, many of
which are still in the making. A cooperative, bilateral relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union would mark a new era in
international politics.
Although renewed relations between the two former superpowers
have been somewhat cautious and reserved, their continued cooperation in
the Middle East crisis at the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991 clearly indicates
a willingness to enter into a new type of alliance. However, if the American
administration is to look to the Soviets as a genuine ally, Soviet domestic
actions are of the utmost significance. If the leadership chooses a path of
forceful coercion toward the republics, this conduct would undoubtedly call
for a hold on warming relations, if not some sort of retaliation, depending on
the severity of the action. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union becomes so
entrenched in these interethnic crises, Gorbachev's domestic reform program
will be delayed, thereby hindering the Soviets' progress in rebuilding their
nation, after seventy-plus years of communist stagnation.
In addition, the outside world has already witnessed how many of the

republics, frustrated at the sluggish rate of reform, have formed restructuring
plans of their own, distinctly separate from those outlined by Gorbachev over
13

the last six years. It is precisely this type of mood which has precipitated anti
communist and anti-soviet movements in most of the republics. The same
democratic forces which helped to bring down the Iron Curtain in 1989 could
feasibly surface in the Soviet Union in 1990s and they, like those in Eastern
Europe, could look towards Western democracies for help and support.

14

CHAPTER I: Background

Before Corbachev, when the Soviet Union was still the "evil empire"
to most outsiders and the gold sickle and hammer against a red background
was a symbol of communist expansionism, the words "Russia" and "Soviet
Union" were used interchangeably. Still today, many people, mainly of an
older generation, do not realize that there is a difference - much to the
chagrin of politically-aware people outside of the Soviet Union, and
undoubtedly to half of the 290 million inside it. However, as the nationality
question has come to demand international attention, the obvious differences
between the two words is becoming better understood, and the old
misconception is being put to rest.
The fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) vary greatly in size,
structure, and ethnic composition. They range from the largest and most
centrally located, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, with a
total population of 148 million, 83% of which is Russian, to the small,
northern republic of Lithuania which is home to 3.7 million people, only 9%
of whom are of Russian origin.f

The Soviet Union's population is 290

million people, of which 52% are Russian. The other 48% is a mixed bag of
twenty one major ethnic groups and numerous other smaller ones. Linguistic
differences have in the past also caused many problems and controversies in

8Paul Quinn-Judge, "The Soviet Union: Empire in Turmoil," The Boston Globe, 22 April 1990, Sec. A.
p.22.
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a country where Slavic languages, spoken in Russia, the Ukraine, and
Byelorussia, differs as much from the Turkic tongues of the southern
republics as they do from English. However, in addition to historical and
linguistic differences among the fifteen republics, there also exist over one
hundred other ethnic groups within the Soviet Union with distinctly
different backgrounds and cultural roots. These differences make it difficult
to force one uniform identity onto the people.

Ethnic Identity

Soviet national identity began to form in 1917 in the wake of the
Russian Revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks sought to create a unified,
harmonious nation incorporating many different regions which now
constitute the fifteen republics. The national structure was defined in January
of 1918 at the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets in a declaration which
proclaimed formerly non-Russian lands as a part of the "federation of Soviet
national republics. "9 The Union continued to expand and build in size up
until World WaI II, when the last four republics were annexed.
Since the Russian Revolution, Soviet leaders have struggled to build a
unified national identity, or at least maintain the myth that there was one.
However, they simultaneously denied the existence of a major interethnic
problem, claiming that by simply adhering to Marxist-Leninist policies and
theories, which served as the basis of the Soviet regime, they were ensuring
harmony and justice. The fact is, however, that Lenin suffered a stroke, and

9Nahaylo and Swoboda, p. 21.
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later died, before he was able to outline a clearly defined plan on how to
handle inter-republic relations in this enormous multinational state. Despite
this hole in the political structure, the Soviet leadership continued for
decades to assert that relations were indeed harmonious. But it was not until
the recent freedoms afforded to the republics through Gorbachev's reform
program that the true nature of relations became apparent. Horror stories of
forced Russification, ethnic discrimination, and oppression surfaced when
Gorbachev opened Pandora's box - a box to which the lid has now been lost.
Regional differences, socio-political cleavages, and inter-ethnic
tensions can no longer be ignored. Violent conflict erupted in 1988 between
Armenians and Azeris over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and
has been continually reignited on numerous occasions since.

Georgia

remains strife-torn as different ethnic groups within the republic, particularly
the Abkhazians and Ossetians, are hostile towards each other and towards the
Georgians themselves. 10 In the southern republics of the Soviet Union,
Muslims and Christians have long been embroiled in violent skirmishes. At
the beginning of 1990, hostile fighting resulted in over one hundred deaths in
Azerbaijan. Red Army tanks rolled into the southern republic to quell the
fighting. Troops temporarily put an end to the violence, but their presence
only exacerbated tension; hostility towards the central government loomed
large over the actual predicament at hand. In the early spring of 1990, ethnic
unrest sparked by a growing nationalist sentiment broke loose in the Baltic
republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. On March II, Lithuania made
history by proclaiming itself independent of the USSR

1OJOOn Packer, "Massed Against the Past," The Economist, 20 October 1990: Survey Section, p. 5.
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CHAPTER II: Building an Empire
The roots of today's nationality crisis in the Soviet Union can be traced
back to the early days of the Roman empire, when the Transcauscasus region
was conquered by the Roman Army. The different cultural identities within
present Soviet boundaries have been evolving for centuries.

Some, like the

Arab and Persian cultures, intermingled early on, creating hybrids which,
over the years, formed distinct identities of their own. Others, like the Tatars,
stayed more or less homogeneous for decades upon decades.
The numerous ethnic groups within each republic and around the
Soviet Union can be broken down into five major ethnic groups. The largest
of all is the Eastern Slavic group, although they are gradually losing their
position to Asians, Moslems, and other ethnic groups whose populations
have been steadily increasing over the past few years. Eastern Slavs include
Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukranians, all of whom share a common
border, as well as similar languages, cultures, and religions.U Historically, the
Slavic culture dates back to the tenth century when a dan of people, probably
descended from the Scandinavians, settled around present-day Kiev.

This

area, known as "Rus," adopted Christianity from the nearby Byzantine
empire, as well as some of their other customs, and soon developed into a
well-known cultural center which was to flourish for centuries to come.l?

llZev Katz, ed., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York: The FreePress, 1975) pp. 9-11.
12Medish. p. 47.
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However, Moscow soon established itself as an organized principality and
supplanted Kiev as the center of Russian society around the 1300s. Gaining
enough power and might over the next few centuries, Russia began to enlarge
its boundaries, using forceful measure to overtake surrounding areas in
Scandinavia and northern Asia. Moscow's population, along with its ever
expanding boundaries, grew rapidly. What eventually turned into the Great
Russian Empire developed politically and socially, and flourished up until
some time around the 18005. Military defeats during this century, coupled
with crumbling central control and social ills, such as the continuation of
serfdom, brought this empire to its knees. By the turn of the century, Russia
was ready for a change.

A revolution occurred in 1905 in an attempt to

change Russia, but it failed. Twelve years later, under the direction of V.I.
Lenin, the Bolsheviks assisted in toppling the tsarist regime and the
provisional government that succeeded it and established a communist form
of government.

At this point in time, under the leadership of a new

government, the formation of a new country began.

The Ukraine
The Kievan region, having been surpassed in size and significance by
Moscow by the fourteenth century, took second place behind the new capital
at this time. The ethnic clan which inhabited the region, the Ukrainians, as
they had come to be known, had established their territory as an independent
state. In the mid-fourteenth century, portions of Ukrainian territory were

19

annexed by Poland and by Lithuania.P Three centuries later, the Ukrainians
rebelled against Poland, pulling away from their control. Caught in a rather
vulnerable position, they were coerced into signing an agreement with Russia
as an autonomous territory. Again in the eighteenth century, the Ukrainians
once again tried to restore their former independence, but failed.. At the end
of the 18005, Russia abolished their autonomous status, and the Ukraine came
under total Russian rule.
During this same century, not surprisingly, Ukrainian nationalism
surged. Partly stemming from the desire to establish independence and partly
influenced by European romanticism, a national consciousness formed,
never to be fully extinguished by the process of Russification. Immediately
following the October Revolution in 1917, the Kiev soviet (council) in the
Ukraine decided to pull away from the central government, then located in
Petrograd (modern-day Leningrad). In December of that same year, Lenin, the
leader of the Revolution, declared that he would permit the republics to
secede or form a confederation with the Russian Republic.

Contradicting

itself shortly thereafter, his government expressed strong displeasure with
their failure to bond with Russia.

But, having received the go-ahead on

secession, Ukranians began to dismantle the Russian military apparatus
within their borders. The Bolsheviks, sensing danger and fearing a loss of
power, quickly intervened and established their own government there.
By 1918, Russian troops had occupied most of the Ukraine and
succeeded in establishing a Bolshevik regtme.i- At first a violent protest

13Nahaylo and Swoboda, p. 7.

14K.atz, p, 24.
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broke out and former Ukrainian leaders fought to keep their own form of
government in power.

The Civil War raged through Ukrainian territory,

embroiling its inhabitants in a merciless struggle. Ukrainians were fighting
for their independence, former "owners" were fighting to reclaim lost land,
and the Bolsheviks were fighting for control of this strategically located
territory rich in natural resources. In the end the Bolsheviks were able to
defeat the tired, oppressed Ukrainians.

The crackdown followed quickly

thereafter as the Bolsheviks tightened control and centralized their power.
They even began placing limits on the use of the Ukranian language. Soon
enough Russification was fully under way. In 1922, the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic was formed.
Under Stalinist rule in the late twenties and thirties, the Ukraine, like
almosr all of the Soviet Union's other republics, was subjected to massive
purges and collectivatization of agriculture. The effects of collectivization
combined with a massive famine in 1933, caused by "the imposition of
excessive delivery quotas" on Ukrainians, resulted in at least a million deaths
by starvation.J> Purges also increased and became more brutal in the mid
19305 when a Ukrainian movement for autonomy emerged.

World War II had an equally devastating effect on the Ukraine. An
estimated 5.3 million Ukrainians lost their lives in the war and roughly 700
towns and 28,000 villages were either completely destroyed or damaged.ts In
addition to major losses to its population, the Ukrainian economy also

15Katz, pp, 24-25.

160rest Subtelny, Ulcraioe - A HistQry (Toronto: University of Toronto. 1988) p. 479.
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suffered inunensely, first under Stalin and then during World War II. Farms,
industries, and whole communities were ravaged, leaving a large portion of
the society to be rebuilt from scratch.
Unification of all Ukrainian territory took place after the war, however,
and the Ukraine saw its borders expanded.

Taking land away from both

Czechoslavakia, Poland, and Romania in the western part of the region, the
Russians established a newer and bigger Ukrainian SSR. Because its borders
had changed, the populace of the Ukraine also underwent a transformation.
The Soviet government sought to help the Ukraine resettle and help the new
Ukrainian population adjust to its new territory. Expanding still more in the
1950s, when Crimea (formerly a party of the RSFSR) became a part of the
Ukraine, the Ukraine almost doubled its size.
After Stalin's death, life in the Ukraine became slightly more tolerable
as rigid laws and disciplinary measures were relaxed a little. Gradually, the
standard of living began to improve for the Ukrainians under the rule of
Khrushchev in the late fifties and early sixties. Ukrainians, who had formed
almost an entirely new culture because of the massive losses suffered under
the Civil War, the Stalinist reign of terror, and the Second World War, had
hope in rebuilding their culture although they remained dependent on the
central government.

The Ukraine had suffered a major setback and was

unable to lift itself back up and thus "improvements in Ukraine's relative
importance....or political successes of individual Ukrainians did not alter the
fact that Ukrainian interests were completely subordinated to those of the
Soviet empire as a whole."!"

17Subtelny, p. 509.
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During the sixties and seventies, Ukrainian society was, as was much of
the Soviet Union, stagnant.

Although reforms were badly needed in all

sectors, political, economic, and cultural, no solutions were offered.

As

Ukrainians struggled to reconstruct their economy, the Ukraine become less
agricultural and more industrialized.

Farming, of course, remained

important for all Ukrainians, but new industry and technology was added to
facilitate their agricultural production. However, the Russians were quick to
take advantage of the Ukrainians' steps towards modernization and exploited
the Ukraine's economic advancement.
In addition to economic suppression at this time, the Russians were
also heavily engaged in stifling cultural development in the Ukraine which
they deemed "dangerous." Another widespread purge in the Ukraine, aimed
at eliminating political enemies, took place in the 1970s when the KGB
cracked down on dissenters by searching suspects, interrogating them, and
throwing them into jail. 18 Politically, the Ukrainians followed the footsteps
of their mentors in Moscow.

Although there were slight deviations, the

Ukraine Communist Party, for the most part corresponded to its counterpart
in Moscow. There were dissenters, of course, but the Communist Party's offer
of stability and organization to the Ukrainians superseded these sentiments.
Compliance, after all, was easier than dissent. Skepticism and dissatisfaction
with society grew however, and by the mid-1980s, the need for reform was
evident. It was at this point, that nationalism began to surge once again.

18Nahaylo and Swoboda. p. 177.
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The Baltic States
While the three Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,

differ

from each other in culture and ethnic composition, they all share a similar
historical background.

Each of these three areas experienced their own

hardships and struggle for autonomy for centuries before finally gaining
independent status in the early 1920s. However, in World War II, they had
their independence taken away again by Stalin.

Now each nation is

undergoing another struggle - a struggle to reclaim their lost independence.
Below, the Baltic states have been grouped together in attempt to show how
the republics strove to develop their own distinct national identity, but now
are unified in their fight to win it back.
All three Baltic territories have long been used by other powers who
wanted to take advantage of, and in some cases steal, their valuable ports on
the Baltic Sea.

Throughout the Middle Ages, Estonia and Latvia were

dominated by other ethnic groups, the Estonians by the Germans and Swedes
and the Latvians by the Germans and Poles. Lithuania, however, stood as an
independent state from the early thirteenth century to the late sixteenth
century. Known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it was a relatively small
territory until it merged with Poland in 1569.1 9
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, Imperial Russia
had set its sights firmly on the Baltic region. In the early eighteenth century,
Estonia was ceded to Russia. At this same time, Peter the Great and his army
invaded Swedish-controlled Latvia, gaining access over the port of Riga and

19Medish. p. 50.
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the territory surrounding it. 2o By the end of this century, the rest of present
day Latvia (which was then a Polish domain) was incorporated into Russia.
Later, in 1814, Russians finally won control over Lithuania, annexing almost
all of this territory into its ever-expanding empire.
Throughout the period of the nineteenth century, the process of
Russification was thoroughly enforced, although this process was widely
resented by the Balts.

Russification included the forceful assimilation of

non-Russians into Russian culture by stifling a specific ethnic group's own
national identity and customs and imposing Russian traditions, language,
and religion. The national character of each state, however,

which was

promoted primarily by the use of indigenous languages in each of the
republics, was only enhanced by the forced Russification. Despite the
repression of Baltic national consciousness, strong cultural identities had
evolved and strengthened over time. However, after Lenin's Revolution in
1917, the Baltic states were set free, for the time being, and autonomy was
established. By 1921, each state was recognized de jure by the international
community as independent states.
During their twenty years of independence, the Baltic states thrived.
After the war, like everyone else, they had to rebuild what had been lost.
Post-war Russia was chaotic and disorganized. The Baltic states were left to
fend for themselves while Russia struggled to get back up on its feet. Thus,
the Baltic states, temporarily freed of Russian suppression, were able to
recreate strong, independent states. Although the war had left them lacking

20Alfred Bilmanis, A History QfLatyia (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970) p, 15.
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most of what was needed to rebuild - i.e., capital, raw material, and means of
production - the Baltic states, eager to prove themselves, brushed themselves
off and began to institute major reforms.
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Land was divided and

redistributed among the peasants and new farms were created, generating
new work for the unemployed. Thanks to their strategic location, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia were able to renew trade on an international level.
Soon enough, both productivity and efficiency soared to new heights. Living
conditions improved and educational and medical facilities were opened up.
Overall, the period between World Wars I and IT proved to be prosperous for
the Balts, who were striving, and succeeding, in proving themselves as
legitimate new states.
World War II changed everything for the Baltics.

The Molotov

Ribbentrop non-aggression pact between Stalin and Hitler which divided up
Poland and the Baltic states was signed in 1939.22 In 1940, Soviet troops were
occupying the Baltic states. In the early summer, after Germany's offensive
on the West, Stalin decided to annex the three Baltic nations. German troops
occupied the region until 1944, when Soviet troops returned.

In each

territory, Russian communist leaders replaced the former governments. The
declaration officially declaring these regions as soviet socialist republics stated
that it was a necessary action to spare each state from exploitation. The Soviet
government stressed that it was "liberating" Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,

21John A. Swettenham, Tragedy oftbe Baltic States (Westport Hyperion Press, Inc., 1981; rpt, 1952)
p. 52
22Robert G. Kaiser. Why Gorbachey Happened (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) p. 285.
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both economically and politically.F' Industry, land, and banking were all
nationalized by the Soviet state, and centralized planning replaced all private
enterprise in the Baltic states.

They were no longer free, but were now

subjugated to the government in Moscow, a government of which they
wanted no part.
Post-war plans of the Soviet government aimed at rebuilding their
country.

In addition to increasing industrial output and mobilizing all

natural resources, the Soviet leadership also instituted rigid disciplinary
measures once again.

As the Cold War commenced in the mid-1940s,

Western thought was not allowed to penetrate the Iron Curtain that had
fallen around Soviet society. Critics of this society were either exiled or
eliminated.

The goal of building socialism and rebuilding society was not to

be interfered with. Nationalism was severely suppressed at this time as it was

seen as incompatible with the objective of creating a unified, socialist society.
Much like the Ukraine, the Baltic region experienced a dead period of
economic and political stagnation in the fifties and sixties.

Arrests for

political dissent continued, although not on the massive scale of Stalinist
years.

But the spirit of nationalism had been resuscitated due to a

combination of dissatisfaction with society under Soviet rule and an easing of
strict disciplinary measures. By the mid-1970s, independence activists in all
the Baltic repulbics had begun to organize their efforts collectively and their
spirits could not be dampened by arrests and bans on publications. Leaders in
Moscow kept a tight leash on the ports in the Baltic region and their
economic activity was controlled from the center. Although relative to the

23Swetten ham. pp, 73-77.
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rest of the union the Baltic region flourished economically, they were
hindered from realizing their full potential by the overbearing Soviet state.
Culturally, the region was stagnant. All types of nationalist activity,
including following national customs, were eliminated.

Religious activity

was curtailed and even banned in some places, as with the Catholic church in
Lithuania.

In 1976, for instance, seven Lithuanian high schoolers were

expelled from school for attending church services. 24 Local police and KGB
officials worked in conjunction to seek out nonconformists and put an end to
their activities. Restrictions were placed on the use of the native language in
each republic and the use of Russian at official levels was obligatory. The
teaching of Russian language was instituted at pre-school and elementary
levels to promote the "unity of statehood, economy, ideology, and culture."25
However, when the gravity of the nationality issue was addressed, as it was by
well-known dissidents Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov in the
mid-1970s, Soviet leadership dismissed both the problem and the problematic
people, kicking outspoken dissenters out of their homeland.

But public

acknowledgement of the crisis merely strengthened the nationalist bond
among the Baltic republics. And as nationalism became more prominent and
reforms within the republics became necessary to appease the Balts, the tiny
region forced itself into the eyes of the central government. By the mid-1980s,
when Gorbachev came into office, a powerful animosity between the Baltic
states and the central government was beginning to develop.

24Joshua Rubenstein, Soviet Dissjdems (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980), p. 223.
25Nahaylo and Swoboda, p. 187.
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Understanding the roots of nationalism in both the Ukraine and in the
Baltic states is crucial to understanding the roots of ethnic conflict as a whole.
As is evident, the seeds of nationalism were being sewn throughout the
history of the development of these regions, yet overt conflict and dissent had
not yet surfaced by the end of the 1970s. However, the spirit of nationalism,
being several decades in the making, was hardly in its early stages when it was
uncovered in the 1980s. When Gorbachev entered office and unleashed all of
the nationalist problems, it was like the top coming off of a pressure cooker.
Although the strife amongst nationalities was bound to surface at some point,
Gorbachev hastened this process by allowing it to happen officially.
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CHAPTER III: Shaping the System

Soviet Leadership: From Lenin to Gorbachev
When nationalism began to reappear in the mid-eighties, many
outsiders assumed that Gorbachev's reforms, coupled with a pulling away
from socialist ideology, were responsible for its emergence. Taking a closer
look, however, it was soon realized that nationalist tension had always
existed and had merely been covered up for several decades.

Moreover,

under the tighter reins of former Soviet leaders, everyone was under close
surveillance, at home, at the workplace, and in school.

Tactics of

intimidation were utilized successfully in order to take care of citizens who
had been "lead astray." Lengthy prison terms and labor camps served as a
remedy for the courageous few who dared to defy the system.
The severe repression under the Stalinist regime had not even been
realized, let alone documented, until three years after his death, when Nikita
S. Khrushchev delivered his "secret speech" to the Twentieth Soviet Party
Congress in 1956. Khrushchev, a former Ukrainian party boss, emerged as the
only viable leader after Stalin'S death. The only other potential successors,
Malenkov and Beria, were both thought by other Party leaders to have
designs on creating a dictatorship and thus were rejected.26 In Khrushchev's

26Joan Frances Crowley and Dan Vaillancourt, Lenin 10 Gorbachev: Three Generations of Soviet
Communists (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1989), pp, 133-134.
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speech, he denounced the crimes under Stalin and cited him as solely
responsible for the deaths of millions of Soviets. Not long after the speech, it
was leaked to the public, some say intentionally, and a program of de
Stalinization began. Many scholars have marked this particular point in time
as a watershed in Soviet politics. For the first time in Soviet history, the
outside world was aware of events, and follies, inside the borders of the
USSR. It was seemingly inevitable that political reforms would have to be
implemented.
In addition to the de-Stalinization program, Khrushchev's leadership

is also known for his attempts at decentralization of the economy and
elimination of Stalinist terror tactics, such as the widespread use of secret
police. Although Khrushchev has never been hailed as the most intellectual
of Soviet leaders, his decision to break away from "Stalinist lies" and the two
camp doctrine was indeed a strategic one. Recognizing the reality of the
nuclear threat, as well as the increasing presence of other major world
powers, Khrushchev aimed at increasing the Soviet Union's viability on the
international scene.
However, in revealing the horrors of Stalinism, Khrushchev also
considerably weakened his own legitimacy as a leader because of the blow that
he dealt to the Communist world as a whole.

Although he offered many

promising prospects for reform, including revision of Marxist-Leninist
theory, his empty words held little meaning and structural changes never
materialized. His intentions to modify society, including his plan to relax the
tight grip on non-Russian republics, had potential but did not get very far.
Tired of too many empty promises and unfinished programs, his own party
colleagues unseated him.
31

In 1964, Leonid Brezhnev took over as General Secretary of the
Communist Party. Brezhnev, like Khrushchev was a native Ukrainian and
had joined the Communist Party at an early age, which thus earmarked him
later as a Khrushchev protege. However, his style and tactics differed much
from his predecessor. Brezhnev was a very cunning man and his personal
and professional manner suggested a sense of order and pragmatism; this was
a sharp contrast to Khrushchev's careless and often unpredictable behavior.
Brezhnev, however, was not as efficient as he initally appeared. He focused
on concentrating power in the center, although, unlike Stalin and
Khrushchev, the power was never intended fully for himself. He amassed
influence and prestige for both himself and his colleagues throughout his
eighteen year's in office.
The period of Brezhnev's leadership, is commonly known as the era of
"stagnation," although marked by increased industrial and agricultural
production. Both corruption and inactivity pervaded the government during
the late 19605 and 19705. Part of the Brezhnev Doctrine stated that "the entire
[socialist] system was responsible for the maintenance of socialism in
particular countries."27 This dogma merely served as justification for Soviet
intervention and expansionism.
Brezhnev also attempted to rehabilitate Joseph Stalin's image, until
angry public protests forced him to brake these activities. He experienced
mixed reaction from Soviets, but began, about the same time as his health
began to fail, to garner more enemies than friends.

Thus, during his

27Allen Lynch, Goroachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences (New
York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989) p. 49.
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leadership, Soviet society and policy regressed and few promising prospects
were seen for the future. Dissatisfaction among Russians and non-Russians
alike with the inactivity and inefficiency in the government was beginning to
grow.
In 1976, Brezhnev suffered a massive stroke. From this point on in his

political career, a parade of ambulances and doctors followed him wherever
he went.

The stroke greatly impaired his speaking ability and his

concentration level was shortened. As his health continued to deteriorate, so
did his political authority.

Progress in the Soviet Union had corne to a

standstilL In 1982, Leonid Brezhnev died.
Yuri Andropov, previously a KGB chairman, was named as the next
General Secretary of the CPSU. Just one year later, at the ripe old age of 69, he
was elected President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This
same year, Andropov's health which was already poor to begin with,
deteriorated further and he was no longer able to make public appearances.
While he had been in better health, Andropov had vowed to make some
small, but promising nevertheless, changes in Soviet life. He had attempted
to increase the productivity of Soviet workers, by cutting down on alcoholism
and absenteeism, a reform that was picked up by Gorbachev where Andropov
had left off. However, it seemed that he had arrived at the top just a little too
late.

In February of 1984, Andropov died. 28

Reforms in the Soviet system, it

appeared, would have to be put on hold until political stability was re
established.

28Crowley and Vaillancourt. p. 182.
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Konstantin Chernenko, another Politburo member

who was even

older than Andropov at the time of taking office, emerged as Andropov's
successor. Although Andropov apparently would liked to have seen a much
younger Gorbachev fill his spot, Chernenko's seniority won out. He had
worked under Brezhnev for over three decades and was a generally
experienced party bureaucrat. Like Andropov, he had good intentions, such
as educational reform and land improvements, which were cut short by
failing health. Assuming the post of Secretary at age 72, Chernenko was
already old and feeble and suffered from a history of lung disease. He died a
year after taking office.29
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, then the youngest member of the
Politburo at age 54, took over as General Secretary the very next day in what
was a remarkably quick transition of power for the Soviets. His haste in
assuming the position led many observers to note that Chernenko was
merely warming up the seat for Gorbachev while he prepared to make his
debut.
By the mid-eighties, it was apparent that social change was imperative
to ensure the durability of the Union. Gorbachev quickly stepped into office
immediately after Chernenko's death, and into a position envied by few .
The Soviet Union in the eighties, stifled by decades of inertia, was not a
promising place. The Soviet people, having witnessed years of inefficiency
within the Party, were ready for a change.

Gorbachev's promises of

perestroika and glasnost were welcomed by frustrated Soviets who were tired
of being held back by a closed, repressive society.

29Crowley and Vaillancourt. p. 184.
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By opening up Soviet

society in affording the people a new voice through glasnost, however, Gorby
got more than he had bargained for. Gorbachev was the first leader since the
Revolution to implement actual social changes for the better. In doing so, he
awakened a "sleeping giant" who, upon opening his eyes, was furious at what
he saw around him.

The Gorbachev Factor
When Gorbachev first outlined his program for reform in front of the
Twenty Sixth Party Congress of the CPSU in 1985, changes in the economic
and political arenas were cited as top priority. From Gorbachev's perspective,
social change, in the form of glasnost, or openness of society, was a necessary
vehicle by which to implement the other reforms, but perestroika and

demokraiizateia were the main concerns.

The crumbling economy and

ineffective political structure served as proof to the need for fundamental
changes within the Soviet system.

Initially well-received by most of the

Soviet public and those within the government, the extensive reform
program and Gorbachev's "new thinking" were viewed as a potential
lifesaver for the USSR.
Gorbachev's glasnost at first came as a shock to the outside world
which received the real figures of alcholism, work absenteeism, and political
and social corruption with astonishment. Socialism, after all, was to have
remedied all these social ills.
attained Marxist ideals.

The Soviet Union, however, had hardly

The rehabilitation of Soviet dissident writers, a

process begun by Khrushchev, continued with Gorbachev as he allowed
works by Boris Pasternak and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to be published at
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home.

Glasnost also unveiled the fundamental flaws within the Soviet

economic system, which gave rise to the need for perestroika. After public
recognition of the economic failure, the party's tight grip on the Soviet
economy began to loosen. State regulation became somewhat less
constrained, allowing smaller economic ministries to revive their own local
power. Factory workers and managers, for example, were given more control
over their individual workplaces and controls on wages were relaxed.t?
Gorbachev also set up long-range plans that would accomplish further
decentralization and signed agreements for military disarmament which, he
realized would also help to rejuvenate the economy. The idea of private
enterprise was explored for a short while by Gorbachev and his colleagues and
then put into action when laws on cooperatives were established.
Unlike glasnost and perestroika, demokratizaisia, or democratization,
has experienced only limited success in the Soviet Union. While much of
the public welcomed plans for democratizing Soviet society, the Central

Committee did not take well to these plans, even at the start when everyone
was enthusiastic about Gorbachev's reforms. A firmly-entrenched aversion
to the capitalist's way of doing things, especially running a country, resurfaced
when Gorbachev introduced plans for implementing democratization into
the highly-centralized elite of Soviet politics. Undoubtedly concerned for
their political careers and wary of radical change, some members of the
Politburo and the Central Committee rejected Gorbachev's appeals for
democratization. After seventy years of single-party rule and relative political
stability, the Soviets saw no need to replace the Communist way.

30Parker, p, 12.
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An Underlying Problem

Gorbachev's policies of democratization and openness have been
relatively successful. The ironclad grip on Eastern Europe was eased in the
fall of 1989, when Communist governments were toppled only to be replaced
by democratic leaders. No longer does the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union maintain a monopoly on all political power. President Gorbachev had
that article deleted from the Constitution in March of 1990. No longer does
censorship prevent the West from seeing and reading about daily events in
the USSR.

If it were not for glasnost, there surely would have been

significantly more deaths in both the Chernobyl accident and the Armenian
earthquake.

Almost immediately after the reports came out about both

disasters, Westerners rushed to the aid of the unfortunate victims. Without
the openness, although it was somewhat delayed, on the part of the Soviet
press, hundreds of lives would not have been saved.

Furthermore,

Gorbachev was instrumental, if not solely responsible on the Soviet end, in
helping to thaw the Cold War.

The Gorbachev-Reagan relationship in the

1980s grew into a friendly alliance at times.
agreements were set.

Arms deals were cut and

US-Soviet relations thrived because of Gorbachev's

efforts to establish renewed bilateral partnership. He even earned himself the
prominent title of Time's 'Man of the Year' in 1989.
However, despite Gorbachev's success on the international scene, a
consistent and effective nationalities policy has yet to be formed. His inability
to act on the problem is hardly due to lack of awareness. His own native
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region, the Stavropol' region in the southern portion of Russia, serves as
home to several different ethnic groups, including Moslems.U In fact, when
Gorbachev came into office, he seemed to not want to have to deal with the
issue directly and passed it off Yegor Ligachev, probably the most conservative
member of the Politburo. Ligachev, Gorbachev's ideology chief and apparent
second-in-command, merely responded by reasserting the predominance of
Soviet central leadership and emphasizing the necessity of maintaining unity
to promote national interests. Thus, his policy on the republics seems largely
incompatible with glasnost and Gorbachev's other reforms.
Early in Gorbachev's administration, it became evident that the Soviet
Union was beleagured by far more social ills than originally imagined. The
world's largest multi-ethnic state was finally having to own up to the fact that
it had been unable to transform a nation of some 290 million people into a
harmonious "melting pot."

And while Gorbachev scrambled to maintain

unity among his republics, they utilized their newly-found liberties to extend
the in. Lenin's dream of the formation of the 'new Soviet man' had never
materialized and non-Russians, and even some Russians themselves, began
to reassess their cultural identities out loud. This nationality problem now
stands at the forefront of Mikhail's agenda.
Major ethnic hostility first confronted Gorbachev in 1986 when he
appointed a Russian to head the Kazakh Communist Party replacing a native
Kazakh leader, sparking a violent national protest.

Outbursts and riots

continued as fighting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the disputed
region of Nagorno-Karabakh grew increasingly violent. Enhanced cultural

31Nahaylo and Swoboda, p. 231.
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autonomy, granted through glasnost, had reignited some old hostilities, such
as the ones in the Georgian republic, and some new ones, as in Uzbekistan.
The conflict between Meskhetian Turks and native Uzbeks in that republic,
which erupted suddenly out of a simple misunderstanding in the market,
reached crisis proportions in 1989. Similarly, a long-brewing conflict in
Georgia between the native majority and the'small ethnic minority, the
Abkhazians, caused a bloody battle which was precipitated by Georgians
taking full advantage of their new-found autonomy.
These hostilities have erupted as a result of a combination of factors.
Firstly, the nationality problem has been suppressed for decades and ethnic
identity, stifled under Russification and repression of nationalism, has not
been allowed to be freely expressed. Since new liberties were granted to the
republics under the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, seventy years worth
of discontent and animosity has come pouring forth out into the open. Thus,
conflicts have broken out revealing the true nature of the problem, the forced
fusion and subjugation of many different cultures and ethnicities.
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CHAPTER IV: Ethnicity and the Broader Crisis

Singling out the ethnicity crisis as separate, unrelated problem in the
Soviet Union is a miscalculation that many observers, especially critics of the
Soviet system, have made. While the question of how, or even if, the Soviet
leadership can keep the country from falling apart centers around the
question of nationality, which is a social dilemma, political and economic
concerns are closely related.

Thus, in order to fully understand how the

Soviet Union has come to face the situation that it does today, it is also
necessary to put the question of ethnic relations into a broader perspective.
The triad of social, political, and economic ills that plague the Soviet
system could potentially lead to the demise of the USSR unless rectified.

The

more the nationalists are dissatisfied with the political or economic situations
in their own countries, the more they will push for independence. On the
same level, the worse the economy gets, the more people will look towards
the individual republics to come up with better solutions, a move which
would necessitate increased economic freedoms. Because of their inextricable
connections with one another, no one problem can be solved independently
of the other.

Economic Troubles
Economically, the Soviet Union is in shambles.

Over the past few

years, there has been a steady deterioration of the economy and decline of
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growth rates, due, in large part, to the failure of the socialist system. By the
time Gorbachev came into office in the mid-19BOs, economic growth was at a
virtual standstill and the Soviet gross national product per capita was the
equivalent of a country like Jordan or Mauritius. 32 Not only was the
economy of the Soviet Union thus unstable, it seemed to actually be
shrinking.
The Soviet Union has had a state-owned economy since the
introduction of communism during the revolutionary era in the early 1920s.
This means that all economic activity is centrally controlled and directed.
The state owns virtually everything from land and natural resources to
buildings and industries to transportation and health facilities. In this type of
system all of these properties of the state are run by state committees, all of
which are subordinate to the primary organ, GOSPLAN)3 Most of these
committees break down further into smaller, more localized associations and
enterprises. However, despite the presence of separate, local ministries, the
reins on the economy are directly controlled by the central government in
Moscow.
Even today, with partial economic reforms in place as Gorbachev has
attempted to move towards a more Western type of economy, much of this
state control has remained intact. The state still serves as the boss of a large
majority of the industrial sector.

Banking, transporation, trade, and

communication are among the many sectors of the economy still controlled

32parker, p. 13.

33Donald Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, Contemporary Soviet PoIjUcs (EnglewoodCliffs: Prentice Hall,
1991) pp. 174-178.
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by the state. 34 Gorbachev has, however, made enormous strides towards
changing the stale socialist system. Since he came into office he has allowed
cooperatives to flourish, relaxed laws on private ownership, and has legalized
private entrepreunerial activities.

However, because the state still does

control much of the means of productions, adventurous entrepreneurs have
had a tough time of getting the raw materials they need to get their businesses
off the ground. In addition, because of the relaxation of laws and loosened
grip of the KGB and other state mechanisms formerly used to impose order,
the black market has also been able to flourish. The predominance of black
marketeers, who deal in everything from basic commodities such as toiletries
to luxury items like Western clothing, has caused the value of the Soviet
ruble to plummet on the official market. At one point in the late 1980s, there
was almost a $1.50 (US) difference in the official and the black market values
of the ruble.
The Russian currency I the ruble, has also posed a major problem for
the Soviets economically. Because the ruble is still non-convertible, the
Soviets have yet to make an entrance into the world market, a shortcoming
which has greatly hindered their trade and growth of capital. Furthermore,
inflation and unemployment are at their highest rates ever, and attempts at
implementing some elements of a free-market system while still maintaining
control over both prices and wages have sent prices on consumer goods
soaring. Price hikes in April of 1991, intended to bring the prices of consumer
goods up to reflect their real costs, are expected to have a devastating effect on
the family budget and to spark nation-wide strikes.

34Medish, p. 159.
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Plans for a rapid transition to a more Westernized economy have been
reneged due to opposition from the right. Hence, the radical economist
Shatalin, who introduced the "Five Hundred Days" program to transform the
stagnant Soviet economy into a free-market system via privatization, has
fallen into a mysterious black hole in the USSR, along with several other
former builders of perestroika.

This plan was originally approved by

Gorbachev back in September of 1990, but later abandoned when opponents of
the liberal plan pressured him into holding off on the transition. The all-too
common "too much too fast" rationalization of the hard-liners, who advocate
a slow, gradual reform process, has once again forced Gorbachev back into the
conservative corner.
Furthermore, if economic reform continues at the rate it is currently
going, the next couple of years hold few promising prospects. In the first few
months of 1991, both the gross national product and the rate of productivity
have fallen significantly.

Moreover, international trade has fallen due to

poor economic conditions in other countries and because of sanctions
induced during the army invasion of the Baltics in January. Productivity will
continue to fall off sharply as industries are cut out, unemployment will
continue to rise, and riots and strikes are likely to become more frequent,
forcing more closings and temporary shortages.
Currently, shortages of food and other consumer goods are forcing
more and more people into the black market and out into the streets in
protest.

With the easing of restrictions on the Soviet consumer since the

advent of perestroika, it has become clear that the Soviet Union is in dire
need of basic commodities.

At the end of 1988, for instance,Pravda reported

that "meat was being rationed. in twenty-six of the Russian Republic's fifty
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five regions, and sugar in all but two of them."35 In the summer of 1989,
Soviet citizens went without essentials such as soap, detergent, and aspirin
because of workers' strikes and inefficient distribution in industry. Even in
Moscow the simplest household items, such as matches, were not available
on store shelves.

But even more importantly, basic goods could not be

obtained by the average Soviet consumer and serious food shortages resulted.
In the fall of 1990, the streets of Leningrad were filled with demonstrators
protesting the lack of cigarettes, causing a major, day-long traffic jam and
forcing the city administration to crack down on the instigators of the protest,
as well as redefine city laws. Shortages of bread, which is one of the staple
foods of the Soviet diet, were reported allover the country as recently as April
of this year. Anxiously waiting in queues for common, everyday items and
products only to find them unavailable, has created Widespread
dissa tisfaction.
Through price reforms, increased industrial efficiency, and other
measures the government hopes to revitalize the economy, but thus far the
reforms that initially promised by Gorbachev to get the country back on its
feet to recovery certainly have been greatly disappointing. Revamping the
Soviet system is a monumental task and Gorbachev has made several
significant steps in the right direction. But unless he stands behind his
reforms, economic or otherwise, the public is sure to lose faith. If he and his
colleagues in the Kremlin tum their backs on reform now, the Soviet Union
may never extricate itself from this mess.

35Stephen White, Gorbachev
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in Power (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. 1990) p. 108.

Since the announcement of Gorbachev's restructuring plan in April,
1985, economic conditions have worsened, riots and strikes have become
more frequent, and this former communist monolith is threatening to come
crumbling down. Thus, the Soviet leadership is slowly being forced to come
to a decision concerning the future of the rebellious republics - from the
northern Baltics down to the southwestern republics of Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan.

Political Flaws

Also on the minds of many careful observers and undoubtedly of
millions of anxious Soviets, in addition to the economic woes, is the
dilemma of trying to govern the peoples of the USSR. From a political
standpoint, Gorbachev is quickly losing ground, as well as supporters. Caught
between the conservative hard-liners who are trying to slow the pace of
reforms and democratic reformers who are trying to accelerate it, Gorbachev
is more and more frequently finding himself unable to mollify either side.
His popularity has been on a steady decline over the last couple of years, so
much so that many people within his own county militantly demanded this
year that he relinquish his Nobel Peace Prize.

As recently as 1989,

Gorbachev's popularity rate was at an impressive 43%. However, during a
session of the Congress of People's Deputies in December, demands were
made for his resignation from office and a vote of "no confidence" was
attempted by some of his colleagues.
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Last fall, studies showed that "less than

2% of the people have any confidence in the future."36 Gorbachev's overall
approval rating had dropped by over 25% by the end of 1990.
Although Gorbachev tried to purge the government of the more
conservative forces in the late eighties, many members of the old guard have
remained in power.

Gorbachev recently named Valentin Pavlov, widely

known in political circles as an advocate of central control and a die-hard
bureaucrat, as the new prime minister. Another conservative figure, Boris
Pugo, a former KGB boss in Latvia, replaced a moderate minister of internal
affairs.

These and other recent conservative appointments by Gorbachev

represent a step backward in the

democratization process. Furthermore,

Gorbachev seems to be either unable or unwilling to diminish the hold on
power that conservative forces like the KGB, the military, and Communist
party leaders maintain. Moreover, conservative groups, such as the political
movement Soyuz ("union") which opposes autonomy for the republics and
demands an increased role of the military, have gained nationwide support
in recent months. Unified groups of conservatives pose a real threat to the
Corbachev government and are gaining significant strength, especially
among industrialists, military officers, and Communist party officials. These
conservatives support the original promise of Gorbachev when he first carne
to office that reforms are necessary, but must take place within the framework
of the communist system.t?

36JeffTrimbie and Douglas Stanglin, "The Last Hurrah," U.S. News & World Report 19 November
1990: p. 34-35.
37JeffTrimble, "Can Gorbachev Last?" U.S. News & World RePOrt 22 April 1991: pp.31-32.
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Although the nation is unlikely to revert to Stalinist repression of a
previous era and can no longer hide under their former shroud of secrecy, the
conservative forces could potentially bring democratization, decentralization,
and privatization to a halt if allowed to consolidate their power. Gorbachev,
unfortunately, is still at the mercy of these people. In November of 1990, for
instance, President Gorbachev met with one thousand military officers who
demanded that he abandon a proposal for a new union treaty in favor of a
plan that would centralized power in the Kremlin.sf In March of this year,
Gorbachev, facing pressure from conservative colleagues and resistance from
the public, announced a ban on all protests in Moscow. Attempting to curb
pro-Yeltsin rallies in the city's squares and streets, Gorbachev handed police
power over to the national Interior Ministry, taking this power away from the
city's democratically elected government. It is now feared that "Gorbachev
may be abandoning perestroika for poryadok (order) and turning to the old
implements of powers and to the old coalition of the military, the KGB, and
the party to enforce

it. "39

From a different angle, Gorbachev is being pushed in the opposite
direction by maverick leaders like the Russian Republic's President, Boris
Yeltsin, Moscow's radical mayor, Gavril Popov, and his Leningrad
counterpart, Anatoly Sobchak. These liberal leaders within the RSFSR, and
numerous others within the rest of the republics, have been successful in
rallying public support and underlining the importance of establishing
democratic principles at local and national levels of government. Stressing

38Douglas Stanglin (a), "A Warning to Caesar," U.S. News & World Repon 7 January 1991: p.33.
39Slanglin (a), p. 36.
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that reforms must be implemented across the board, these leaders and their
reformist colleagues are prompting Gorbachev for faster and more pervasive
reforms. Yeltsin, who was once removed from his position at the Politburo
by Gorbachev only to bounce back. as the leading Populist politician in Russia,
is reportedly backed by an impressive 40% of the Russian people, a stark
contrast to Gorbachev's 17% public support rating. 40 Most of the democratic
leaders in govemment positions have fared the same among the public, but
are endangered by a clampdown enforced by the Kremlin.
Democrats have allied themselves with even the most radical groups
in an attempt to avoid anything related to conservatism and the communist
leadership. Even the striking coal miners, of which there were an estimated
300,000 at the beginning of April of this year, have found friends in
democratic reforrners.O Reformers and nationalists have sought to form an
alliance, as did Yeltsin in the summer of 1990 when he announced the
independence of the Russian Republic from the Soviet Union, following the
lead of secessionist republics like the Baltics. The democratic platform of
social-democrats in the Soviet Union, which reformers avow to support, calls
for more autonomy in the outlying republics.
A recent sharp drop in the number of pro-democracy demonstrations
and a decline in democratic publications, however, reflects fear of a backlash
like the one that throttled democratic protesters in the tragic Tiananmen
Square incident in June of 1989. An anticommunist demonstration in the

4ORobin Knight, "Dismantling Lenin's Legacy," U.S. News & World Report 9 July 1990: p.27.

41Brian Friedman "The Kremlin Yields," The Boston Globe 4 April 1991: p.2.
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center of Moscow in December of 1990 only rallied about 1,000 supporters and
many of Moscow's leading supporters of the democratic movement did not
show up.

One democratic deputy mayor, justifying his decision to stay at

home, said, "This is a very serious winter, [and] any demonstration can bring
on the unpredictable, even violence."42
As the liberal force, which once merely stood up for reform, is turning
more and more radical and the government is facing increasing pressure
from the right, the public, fearing for their well-being, are shying away
altogether. Because both groups have failed to compromise with each other,
in congress and out on the streets, they have resorted to extreme positions.
The widening gap between the conservatives and liberals is undoubtedly also
a product of continued dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and
failure to see results with the reform program.
There are thus two opposing views taken by the informed public
concerning the status of reforms. Some citizens, mainly younger and more
liberal, say that the reform movement has moved too slow and its pace must
be quickened to ensure viable end results. They want to see democratization
implemented as it has been throughout Eastern Europe, across the board, not
sluggishly and incrementally. Yet another sector of the public, clinging to the
stability of the past and fearful of what change may bring to their country,
claims that the reform process is going too fast and trying to accomplish too
much. Strangely enough, both views are partially valid. The liberals are right
in thinking that reforms must be "all or nothing," lest the government end

42carrollBogen. "Where Have all the Democrats Gone?" Newsweek 7 January 1991: p.38.
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up accomplishing nothing, but conservatives have correctly observed that
chaos has been the primary result of trying to make so many changes in such
a vast system all at once. Hence, the Soviet people are becoming increasingly
polarized and seemingly confident with their respective decisions, but the
country's future is only becoming more nebulous.
Disillusionment with the central government and its ability to solve
the crisis has led to many nationalists taking matters into their own hands.
Hence, democrats in the Russian Republic are moving out - out to the
republics, allying themselves with nationalist groups fighting for
independence from Moscow. Conservatives, on the other hand, are moving
inward to centralize their power, in their attempt to preserve unity. The old
notion of the inability of socialism and nationalism to coexist is still alive and
well among conservatives.
Thus, while the gap between conservative Communists and reform
minded democrats continues to widen, Gorbachev, once straddling the
middle, is steadily losing his balance. He has been verbally attacked during
sessions of congress from members of both sides and been publicly criticized
on television and in the press. Former Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, once Gorbachev's closest ally and probable choice for the
newly-created post of vice-president, shocked Gorbachev and the Congress in
December of 1990 by announcing his resignation. Citing dismay over the
reform process and a deep-seated fear that the country was "unambiguosly
moving towards authoritarianism," Shevardnadze stepped down from his
position leaving Gorbachev with two empty spots to fill (text of speech,
12/90).

Other supporters, such as former Politburo colleague, Yegor

Yakovlev, once called a "cornerstone" of perestroika, have resigned for
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similar reasons. In many cases, Communist party apparatchiks have been
chosen to fill these positions abandoned by disillusioned supporters of
perestroika.

The Nationalities Issue: A Social Crisis
Gorbachev's economic and political troubles are only exacerbated by
nationalist tensions within his crumbling empire.

A multiple crisis has

attacked the Soviet system and each problem seemingly feeds on the other.
Political and economic troubles have led to unrest in the republics, while
simultaneously nationalist tension within the republics has caused strikes,
demonstrations, and other protests which have

negatively affected the

political and economic atmosphere.
All fifteen soviet socialist republics have declared some sort of
sovereignty and many of the smaller autonomous regions and oblasts are
following in the same footsteps . Pro-independence groups within the three
Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia and the Ukraine have worked out
plans for establishing independence from the central government. Even the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) threatened to secede
from the Soviet Union last June under a plan drawn up by Yeltsin. Mikhail
Gorbachev has desperately tried to convince the republics to stay together and
work out differences and problems with each other, not individually. In a
speech to Parliament last November, Gorbachev declared his opposition to
the "fragmentation of territory" and urged his peoples to maintain unity
(Televised address to Parliament, 11/14/90).
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The question Gorbachev would probably most like to have answered is
why, after so many decades of relative stillness, nationalistic aspirations are so
noisily resurfacing. Certainly by now he has made the connection between
the easing of social rigidity under his reforms and the resurgence of
nationalism, but the underlying reason might be a little more ambiguous.
After all, the Soviet Union is not the only multi-ethnic state in the world.
Yet ethnic hostility is not seemingly threatening the very existence of each of
these other heterogeneous nations.
It seems as though the concept of ethnicity in the Soviet Union has

been both misunderstood and neglected by past and present leaders.

To

assume that the assimilation of so many different cultures into one unified
identity using coercive and even hostile measures is a feasible concept is
naive at best.

Webster's dictionary defines

attitudes, habits...of an individual or group."

ethos as "the characteristic
Mankind is best divided up by

these features, namely different customs, languages, religious beliefs, and
other such attributes. Identity of an ethnic group is determined by social,
political and economic interests and is controlled by its cultural and historical
roots. Although people have the right to choose their own social
environment, ethnic identity is primordial and cultural roots can not be
exchanged. Man is an inherently sovereign being, the desire for individual
freedom is inbred. Thus, "at the margin of choice, today most people would
rather be governed poorly by their own brethren than well by aliens,
occupiers, and colonizers. "43

43Joseph Rothschild, Ethnooolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) p. 14.
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Self-determination, then, is a powerful, instinctive attribute of
different nations and ethnic groups.

If national impulses are denied or

suppressed by an oppressor, that specific exploited group will reject the
domination. The rejection may be tacit at first, but will undoubtedly surface
over time. The longer the suppression, the more violent the reprisal. The
suffocation of national and cultural identity of the annexed republics is what
has led to the angry vindictiveness against Russian oppressors. Animosity
over this oppression was bottled up for decades, stifled by harsh autocratic
regimes.

Once the republics were allowed to vent their anger and

frustrations, their vengeance came out in full force.
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CHAPTER V: Heat of the Moment

Gorbachev and Today's Crises: Crackdown from the Center

Ethnic unrest had begun to pose such a problem to the central
leadership in Moscow that the Kremlin began to issue threats to rebellious
republics by the end of 1990. In November of 1990, then Soviet Premier
Nikolai Ryzhkov threatened the Baltic states with economic repression if
they did not cooperate with Moscow. He demanded that they abide only by
Soviet laws, such as tax regulations.

Furthermore, he warned the three

republics that hard currency funding from the central goverrunent would be
cut off if the Baltics went ahead as planned and did not participate in
scheduled talks on the ruble.

Moldavia was threatened in a like manner

when Gorbachev demanded in December that they nullify a law that made a
Romanian dialect the state language.
At the beginning of

January, 1991, the Soviet Defense Ministry

announced that units of paratroopers were begin sent out to rebellious
republics such as the Baltics, Georgia, and Moldavia. Their mission, ordered
by the Kremlin, was to enforce the military draft and hunt down deserters.
One week later, on January 13, the Red Army launced an assault on
Lithuania's capital city in an attempt to ensure the transfer of power from the
democratically elected parliament to a new conservative government under
Central Committee control. This new government, who called themselves
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the National Salvation Committee, had mysteriously appeared out of
nowhere and been immediately aided by military forces. Tanks entered the
city at dawn, running down unarmed civilians who stood in the way. Press
facilities were taken over by the army and media buildings were closed down.
Three days later, Gorbachev said he had no prior knowledge of events before
the attack,44 Although Western officials remained skeptical, Gorbachev
denied repeatedly that he had ordered the attack. Gorbachev later defended
the army's crackdown, calling the attack. necessary.
By the middle of January, troops had stationed themselves in Estonia
and Latvia, as well. Paratroopers and shock troops stand "ready to move into
the secessionist strongholds of Georgia and the western Ukraine. "45 The
presence of the army has had a direct correlation with the increase of active
nationalism in these and other republics.

The random and sometimes

unprecipitated violence seems not to deter their drive for independence.
Today troops still occupy these areas and have made no plans on moving
until the nationality issue has been settled, preferably Gorbachev's way.

The Baltics and the Ukraine Today
The drive for independence has differed in each republic. In some it
has been quite comprehensive and successful, while in others it never gained
much steam.

In Soviet Central Asia, nationalists are part of an almost

44Kaiser, p. 395.
45Rose Brady and Rosemarie Boyle, "Back to Iron Fists and Brazen Lies," Businessweek 28 January 1991:

p.41.
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insignificant minority and there are no demands to separate from the Soviet
Union, on which it has become so dependent. The Transcauscasian republics
seem to want increased autonomy, but are too caught up with their own
internal ethnic strife, that they have not been able to mobilize an organized
front.

Interethnic hostility throughout the Soviet Union, thus, is not

uniform or consistent. Anti-Russian sentiment differs from place to place,
but is strongest among non-Russian nationals.

This, however, only

intensifies Russian resentment towards non-Russians. Thus, the nature of
the relationship between Russians and non-Russian nationals is cyclical. The
Russians, or the Russian leadership anyway, strive to eliminate the animosity
connected to nationalism, but in doing so, assert their own predominance
and stifle the breeding of any other ethnic consciousness. Their actions, in
turn, reinforce nationalist resentment. 4 6

Since overt separatism began

brewing at the beginning of the end of the 19805, nationalist efforts have
varied in intensity and scope, yet all the defiant republics have essentially the
same gripe with the central government.

Each rebellious republic is

demanding more political and economic autonomy although the efforts to
attain this goal have varied.
Overall, the Ukraine and the Baltic republics have the most organized
and extensive programs for trying to re-establish lost freedoms. In the late
1980s, as ethnic unrest came to the fore in the Baltic region, "popular fronts"
were organized in each republic. Latvians took the lead, forming a popular
front in 1987, and Estonia and Lithuania soon followed.s?

46K.atz, pp. 18-19 .

47Walter C. Clemens , Jr., "The Baltic Way," World Monitor May 1990: p.6O.
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In Lithuania,

activists in Sajudis, the pro-indepence group, took dramatic steps towards
restoring independence. In Estonia and Latvia, actions taken by

pro

independence groups were intended to be more gradual, but equally intense.

Rukh, the Ukrainian independence movement, has gained popularity and
influence over the past year and was mainly responsible for their declaration
of sovereignty.
Many of the Soviet republics, including all the Balties and the Ukraine,
wish to utilize their new freedoms to enact their constitutional right to secede
from the union into which they were forcibly incorporated. Under Chapter 8,
Article 72 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
"Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the
USSR."48 Lithuania was the first of the republics to take the law into their
own hands in March of 1990 when they declared independence.
A newly-elected parliament in Vilnius, Lithuania's capital, announced
on March 11 that it had voted to secede from the USSR and restore its pre
World War II independence. The Kremlin, ignoring the fundmental rights
granted to the republic under the Constitution, responded by cutting off all oil
and shutting off 80% of the natural gas supply to Lithuania, which is almost
entirely dependent on Moscow for both resources.t? The economic embargo
placed on the maverick republic was supposed to serve as a lesson for all, said
officials in the Kremlin. Leaders in Moscow also set a deadline by which the
Lithuanians were supposed to have revoked this declaration, only eight days

48Barry and Barnet-Barry, p. 346.
49Mark Porubcansky (a), "Soviets Tighten Lithuanian Blockade," The Boston Globe 20 April 1990: p.
10.
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after the republic had announced secession.

Gorbachev sent in military

aircraft to fly over the Baltic territory as the deadline neared, claiming that the
Lithuanian proposal was illegal.

Promising conservatives that the

declaration would lead nowhere, Gorbachev made both threats and demands
on the small Baltic nation.
A short while after the passage of the independence legislation,
Gorbachev announced that if Lithuania did not annul its declaration, it
would have to pay Moscow back in retribution for having invested in the
republic. He demanded that Lithuanians repay 21 billion rubles (or about
US$34

billion)

for

"Soviet

investment."

Sajud is,

Lithuania's

proindependence group, retorted that the Soviet central government owed
Lithuania an estimated 300 billion rubles in compensation for the "300,000
people who were killed, imprisoned, or exiled.... by Stalin."50

New

Lithuanian Presiden t Vytautas Landsbergis rejected Gorbachev's demands
that he annul the legislation, but was finally forced into a compromise
position one month after the declaration when armored vehicles rode into
Vilnius, threatening to take over.
Lithuania's Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Estonia, announced plans for
similar declarations in the spring of 1990, although both said that they would
opt for a more gradual, less dramatic transition to sovereignty. By May of
1990, however, the Baltic crisis had reached a dangerous level. Sanctions in

all three republics had begun to affect everyday life as shortages of gasoline
and natual gas forced closings and shutdowns of plants, offices, and other

5~ Porubcansky (b), "Ligachev Bars Use of Force;' The Boston Globe 13 March 1990: p. 2.
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businesses. Yet as time wore on, Gorbachev seemed further and further away
from offering any viable solutions and the secessionist republics seemed less
willing to compromise. Lithuania and Estonia had already begun by the
middle of last year to establish multi-party systems, moving away from the
single-party, socialist system.
Following the Baltic lead, the Ukrainian Republican Party and Rukh
joined together in a unified demand for economic and political independence
last year. By the beginning of June of 1990 the Ukraine was pushing towards
changes in the constitution which would allow for increased autonomy and
complete control over their own natural resources. The Ukraine, often called
"the bread basket of the Soviet Union", is responsible for almost one quarter
of the country's total food production.
By the end of June, Vladimir Ivashko, a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet

Member and former Gorbachev ally, submitted a draft of legislation calling
for autonomy.

Ukrainian independence leaders began pressing for each

secessionist republics to demand independence and seek out "lateral
cooperation." 5 1 In October, after having suffered through several weeks of
strikes and demonstrations in the Ukraine, Rukh decided to seek full
independence.

The Ukrainian Congress which passed the legislation

"committed itself

to a nonviolent transformation" into an independent

republic. 52

51Douglas Stanglin (b), "Reaping the Whirlwind," U,S, News & World ReWo 28 January 1991: p.55.
52carey Goldberg, "Ukrainian Movement Resolves to Seek Independence." The Boston Globe 29 October
1990: p. 4.
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The reaction of the central government to the Ukrainian independence
movement differed greatly from their harsh, militaristic reaction to the Balts'
steps towards secession.

Proindependence leaders' decision to opt for a

gradual transition to a freer republic probably stood as much less of a threat to
Moscow than did the Lithuanians' drastic and sudden decision to break away
from the union.

Moreover, the history of nationalism in the Baltic region

has been much more troublesome for the government in Moscow than it has
been in the Ukraine, a region which has its roots in the Slavic tradition.
Many Russians maintain close relationships with the neighboring
Ukrainians, mainly due to linguistic and religious similarities, coupled with a
similar historical tradition. There has also been a rise in the Ukraine recently
in in-migration by Russians, particularly in the industrial areas, such as the
Donbas region. 53

Russification in the Ukraine has thus been more

pervasive, partially because of its proximity to the RSFSR and its large
Russian population and partially because of its vulnerability over the past few
decades. Studies have proven that "attitudes toward the ideal government
and social and economic organization of society are a general cultural trait
shared by both Russians and Ukranians.t'R
The Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians are all Slavs and
therefore share cultural similarities which have created a sort of bond among
them. To kill or harm a fellow Slav would be seemingly self-destructive.
Even the Soviet military realizes this cultural connection and admit that
"shooting Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other Slavs is quite

53S ubtelny, p. 525.
54Seweryn Bialer (a), Inside Gorbacbev's Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1989) p. 18.
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different from shooting Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians."55 The
Balts are not of Slavic origin, but in fact all have European roots. Customs,
traditions, and cultural behavior of the Balts are far removed from those of
the Slavs.

Thus, there is a much weaker inclination to treat the BaIts as

brothers, or even as true allies for that matter.
From an economic perspective, the Balts have demonstrated the ability
to survive on their own, as they did for two decades between the two world
wars.

Their "self-financing" reforms, begun in the late 19805, have proven to

be successful thus far . Financially, they are the most successful of all the
republics, including the Russian Republic. They have shown they are both
willing and able to establish their own, independent forms of government
that have little or no connection to the socialist system. Because they have
been dependent on the Soviet system for so long, however, they probably
could not make it as a unified, independent territory or as separate states just
yet. Being part of the union requires that you contribute equally to the Soviet
state as a whole and because of this, they have lost out. Republics rely heavily
on one another for trade and have come to depend on this reliance. If trade
were cut off to any region, the affected republic would surely suffer, at least in
the short-run. Supplies would be in greater demand and industries could
very well shut down all together. This dependence on imports renders the
republics all but chained to the Soviet economy.
Transforming the Baltic region into separate independent states would
require changing the whole system into a newer, more Western version,

55Seweryn Bialer (b), "The Kremlin Crossroads," U.S. News & World Report 22 January 1991: p.33.
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something that might not be so easy to convince farmers and factory workers
of right away. A new form of currency would have to be created and Soviet
troops withdrawn, meaning that many Estonians would have to find other
employment or work towards creating a whole new military complex. These
changes, and undoubtedly countless other necessary transformations, would
take time, but will probably be successful in the long run. The task would be
neither easy nor speedy. From a more optimistic point of view, for the Balts
at least, their strategic location on the Baltic Sea makes them an easy target for
Western aid if they are able to establish complete independence.
Furthermore, the neighboring Scandanavian countries will be able to provide
a little boost to their economy if a good balance of trade is established.
The Ukraine, on the other hand, is more financially dependent on
Moscow. Despite an abundance of agricultural produce, particularly wheat
and grain, Ukrainians are largely dependent on Moscow to provide them
with machinery, transport, and other essentials that can make their valuable
raw materials into finished products. Their dependence stems largely from
debts incurred in borrowing from Russia after having suffered devastating
losses during tragic periods such as the famine in the 1930s and the
occupation of their territory in World War II. Despite the fact that Russia
itself inflicted much of the pain and catastrophe upon the Ukraine, they still
are indebted to Moscow for helping pull them out of agricultural
backwardness and helping them rebuild their territory. Moscow is primarily
responsible for the building of large industries and factories that have made
the Ukraine a modernized industrial center.
The nuclear disaster at Chemobyl in the Ukrainian SSR in 1986 made
the Ukraine even more reliant on the central government for aid.
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Over

100,000 Ukrainians were forced out of their homes after the huge nuclear
reactor caught fire. Radiation emitted from the plant has caused extensive
ecological damage across the Soviet Union, damaging valuable crops and
arable land. The causes of the explosion at Chernobyl, a Soviet-built nuclear
energy plant, were later cited as operators' errors, inefficient equipment, and
regulation violations, all of which were essentially the responsiblity of the
central government. 56 The "breadbasket" republic was forced to abandon
much of its produce out of danger of contamination. In addition, thousands
of people and animals have been exposed to high levels of radiation in and
around Chernobyl.

The incidence of cancer

in this region has risen

drastically since the diaster and genetic disease stemming from the accident
will undoubtedly plague the region for generations to come.

Thus, the

Ukraine has found itself the victim of another unfortunate circumstance
caused by Soviet dominance.

The Ukrainians are caught in a cycle,

perpetuated by the Russians, from which it has become increasingly difficult
to escape.
Politically, the BaIts have also made significant strides in trying to
prove their legitimacy. Democratic elections have taken place in all three
republics forming the basis for their congresses and parliaments. With their
newly created parliaments they have overridden Soviet laws and passed
many of their own. Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians all joined together
in protest in August of 1989 on the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

In this non-violent demonstration both the pact

and the annexation were declared illegal and void. The Balts are unified in

56Nigel Hawkes, Chemobyl; The End of the Nuclear Dream (New York: Vintage Books, 1986) p. 100.
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their struggle for independence, demonstrating this "oneness" of mind in a
human chain that stretched across all three of the republics during the
August demonstration.
In the Ukraine, however, the organization of political forces pushing
for autonomy is relatively new. Rukh was only formed in 1989 and began its
struggle for independence by demanding freer use of the Ukrainian
language. 57 Henceforth now, in 1991, their political battle has just begun and
is still in its developmental stages. The ousting of Communists was called for
as early as the beginning of 1990, but Moscow is too nearby to let the Ukraine
stray far from communism. Conservative Corrununist party members still
dominate the Ukrainian government today.

Demonstrations and protests

have been the prominent feature of the Ukrainian thus far as no solid steps
have been taken to create a new political system.

Thus, not only is the

Ukraine divided between reformers and conservatives, but it is also split
between Western Ukrainians and other Ukrainians. The Westerners want to
create a whole new territory unto to themselves with full independence
from the Ukrainian SSR, as well as from the Soviet Union itself.

These

divisions make it more difficult for Ukrainians to form a unified decision on
the issue of freedom, and easier for Moscow to justify enforcing unity.
Baltic territory is also a relatively new acquisition for the USSR, which
makes them much less "Soviet" than Ukrainians. In fact, the Balts are much
more European than they are Russian. Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine today,
was actually Russia's first capital. In fact, today's Russia really evolved out of

57Bruce Nelan (b), "Lashed by the Flags of Freedom." lJ.!lK 12 March 1990: p.29.
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Kievan Rus. The history of Kiev and the origin of the Russian state dates
back to the ninth century. Baltic-Russian relations, however, only go back to
about the eighteenth century, when the Russians were anxious to establish
new ports.

And even after the Russians did move into Baltic territory, they

never fully infiltrated the land, but merely used the region for access to the
Baltic Sea.
Today, both the Ukrainian republic and the Baltic states are continuing
in their fight for independence from the USSR, who seems not yet ready to
relinquish these territories.

The Soviets, refusing to recognize anyone's

independence, have retained control over these areas, however,

and

continue to use threats of force if the republics take any drastic measures.
Balts have argued that they are not doing anything wrong in repossessing
their statehood, but rather that the Soviet leadership is violating
in terna tional law by forcing them to stay in the union.

Citing their

constitutional rights as proof of the validity of their actions, they are
demanding freedom. Gorbachev has never really denied that the rights to
secession and freedom exist, but he has stated "that the Baltics and others
should not try to exercise it (the right to secession) until new laws are passed
that spell out the procedure for seceding."58 Yet Gorbachev has not offered
any kind of legislation for such a procedure, except for the new union treaty,
which is not seen as a compromise by the secessionist republics.

Attempts to Maintain Unity

58Clemens, p. 60.
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Other legislation has been devised by leaders in Moscow in an attempt
to try to keep the union together.

At the beginning of March of 1991,

Gorbachev announced the plan for a referendum voting to take place on
March 17 in which citizens of the Soviet Union would be able to choose
whether or not to maintain unity amongst the republics. The referendum
ballot, which included other issues such as the implementation of an
executive presidency, was worded differently in a few republics due to
linguistic differences. The original question, however, concerning the issue
of unity was:

"Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as an

alliance of equal sovereign states?"

The referendum was a first in the Soviet

Union and in a televised speech Gorbachev called the referendum an "issue
affecting the present and future of our multinational state....the country's
destiny."59 The leadership and officials within the government repeatedly
stressed the significance of the ballot, but six republics (Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Georgia, Moldavia, and Armenia), seeing the referendum as a token
gesture and an uncompromising alternative, refused to take part in the
voting.

Gorbachev, in answering questions from Soviet and foreign news

correspondents, commented after the voting day had drawn to a close that he
was confident that this vote would mean that the country was moving
towards a "renewed Union," yet he did not comment on the republics which
did not participate in voting on the unity question.
Citing reasons for choosing not to participate in the polling, Lithuanian
President Vytautas Landsbergis called the referendum "a deception" and said

59paj!y Report Soviet Union, 18March 1991 "Gorbachev Televised AddressSupports Union"
(Washington, D.C.: FBIS-SOV-91-059) p. 25.
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that the results had already been "calculated in advance."60 Yet an estimated
500,000 voters (almost all Russian) turned out to participate despite the fact

that there was an official ban, the same was reported in the other two Baltic
republics and Moldavia .

Apparently, the protest was not a unanimous

decision, everywhere, and it can be assumed from population figures that the
voters who did show up at the polls were not all Russian.

Some Balts

claimed that they merely wanted to have a stake in their future rather than
simply protesting it. Not wishing to be hypocritical in their quest for a more
democratic society, protesters afforded those who did wish to vote the
opportunity, and public organizations and some work collectives set up
polling stations. Official results of the referendum in these areas have not yet
been made public by the official Soviet news agency, TASS. TASS reported
extremely high voter turnout rates in many places, particularly the Central
Asian republics and publicized preliminary results that showed upwards of
90% of the population voting "yes" in Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan,

and other republics.s!

Widespread fraud and voting violations were

reported, however, despite the monitoring of polls by Soviet people's
deputies (of the Congress of People's Deputies). In one town soviet, called
Tolyatti, the number of ballots counted turned out to be greater than the
number of ballots that had been originally given out. These incidents, mainly
reported in the Baltic region, were reported to Soviet law enforcrnent agencies
and the referendum commission. Citing improper methods and observation,
many have discredited the referendum.

600aily RePOrt Soviet Union , 20 March 1991

'" Hundreds of Thousands' Vote in Referendum"
(Washington, D.C.: FBIS-SQV-91-054-S) p, 33.
61Ibid, p. 30.
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CONCLUSION

Despite Gorbachev's adamant opposition to the break-up of the Soviet
Union, secessionist republics seem not to be heeding his words. His pleas
seem to have come too late and with too few concessions. Once again,
Gorbachev has found himself tangled up within his own web.

Flames of

democratization, sparked by his own perestroika program, have begun raging
through his country and Gorbachev is having difficulty trying to extinguish
the fire. He has been caught up in a series of contradictions which threaten
his hold on power. Claiming, at least at one time, to endorse a free-market
system, he has yet to provide a concrete plan for transition and remains
unwilling to open up his country to private enterprise. He has also vowed to
give the Soviet people freedom of expression, yet has shut down publishing
buildings in the Baltic republics and elsewhere and appears to moving back
towards a poliey of censorship. Moreover, while touting political reform to
world leaders, Gorbachev is denying the republics their rightful sovereignty
on the homefront.

The Red Army has used force to quell tension in the

rebellious republics, killing hundreds of demonstrators since they began to
utilize these tactics in 1986. From Kazakhstan east to Armenia and all the
way north to Lithuania, Soviet troops have assaulted unarmed civilians and
peaceful protesters whose only end has been to restore what had been
kidnapped by the Great Russian Empire - land, freedom, and cultural identity.
The Baltic states, well on their way to independence, are not showing
any interest in compromise with the Kremlin. They are unlikely to move
anywhere but forward in their struggle to regain their former statehood
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despite how long this struggle may take. Their ethnic and cultural roots are
far removed from the Russian tradition.

Peaceful, successful assimilation

could probably not occur even if Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were to
consent to it. Moreover, freedom and autonomy are recent memories for the
Balts. The repressive annexation which abruptly cut off their successful drive
towards establishing themselves as legitimate states is still a fresh wound.
Neither tradition nor history binds the Baltic republics to the Russian
motherland. The fate of the Baltic republics was decided by the Russians in
accordance with their desires and needs.

There existed neither legal

foundation nor moral justification for the forcible annexation of the Baltic
states.62
Even the threat of force does not seem to discourage their plans for
renewed independence. Every step that Gorbachev takes towards
authoritarianism, the Balts take a counter-step towards independence. In
trying to preserve a centralized structure, he is pushing the independence
minded republics further away from the center. The Baltics, who have a good
deal of support in the West, are likely to break away from the union
altogether before the beginning of the next century unless a violent
crackdown occurs first.
The Ukraine, however, is less likely to pull away from the union, at
least in the near future. Economic dependency on other republics, especially
the Russian Republic renders them too vulnerable to pull away completely.
Despite the Ukraine's growth and development over the past few decades
into a major industrial power in the Soviet Union, it is still unable to survive

62Swettenham, p. 50.
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without outside assistance.

Although Russia itself is to blame for poor

socioeconomic conditions in the Ukraine today, it would not have been able
to rebuild what it had lost without the aid of Russians.
Ukrainians probably do not, for the most part, want to sever their close
cultural ties with the other Slavic republics, Russia and Byelorussia.
Although a distinct form of nationalism has evolved over time within
Ukrainian territory, it is still too young to separate itself from Russia.
Gradually, as cultural revitalization is allowed to flourish, if it is indeed
allowed to grow at all, the Ukrainian nationalist independence movement
will find its place and possibly be able to establish itself as a free nation.
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Epilogue

Seventy years of rule by a highly centralized, oppressive state which
emphasized the predominance of the state over the individual have resulted
in widespread dissatisfaction and resentment towards the government.
Although Gorbachev's reforms initially offered a hope for the future, his
inconsistency with policy and failure to follow through on reform programs
have resulted in disillusionment. Today, the people in the Soviet Union do
not like what they see.

Uncertainty and a lack of faith in the Soviet system

has led to alienation from the union itself and an increase in ethnic
nationalism.

By trying to force several different cultures and ethnicities into

a legitimate state, without accounting for the differences and not allowing
cultural growth within each separate territory, the Soviet Union decided its
own fate. The forging of nations into one larger body under the rules and
laws of a single, centralized body and subsequent repression of development
goes against all the natural laws of personal freedoms.

And when an

individual's liberties or rights have been infringed upon, the result is
resistance towards that body. Today, the Soviet Union is witnessing collective
resistance towards the oppressive body - the central Soviet government.
Thus, Gorbachev's problems are mounting.

Politically and

economically, the country is breaking down and ethnic and and nationalist
tensions, wrapped up in the political and economic crises, may soon cause a
breaking up. The forces unleashed six years ago by "new thinking" and an
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ambitious reform program unveiled by Gorbachev are now threatening to
sweep him away. And with increased domestic confusion and chaos, Soviets
are beginning to look into the future with heightened aprehension and
skepticism. But the threat of a return to former days of repression and
authoritarianism are directly challenged by forces of democracy uncovered by
glasnost. Leaders and citizens of the Soviet Union alike fear, justifiably, that
civil war could be lurking around the next comer.
Taking into account the historical background of nationalist tensions
and other domestic dilemmas, the recent past, and the present social situation
in the Soviet Union, we are thus left with only a few possible scenarios for
the future:

The first and perhaps the most optimistic scenario is that

democratic reforms will win out. If the reformers take power, the hard-liners
are ousted, and democratization is fully implemented, the Soviet Union
could be looking at a freer, looser confederation of states. Harmony among
the different nationalities could generate support for the political and
economic reforms that are so desperately needed today.
A second, far more dangerous scenario entails civil war.

If the

economic, political, and ethnic situations are allowed to deteriorate until an
all-out revolution is the only answer for the Soviet people, then the
revamping of the Soviet system will take perhaps another whole generation
to accomplish. Or, on the other hand, if the use of force to prevent ethnic
unrest or economic protest escalates, and nationalists or workers group
together to topple the government or fight the military, massive violence and
bloodshed would surely result. In any event, if civil war were to occur, the
USSR would be left in pieces and fragments, rather than as a united nation.
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The last plausible scenario for the future is the consolidation of power
by the right. If Gorbachev or any other successor creates a coalition with the
military, the KGB, and other conservatives in an effort to prevent
destabilization and deunification, the Soviet Union might revert to an
authoritarian regime. The presence of a solid conservative faction presents a
real threat to the Soviet Union today. If hard-liners are able to accumulate
enough strength and defeat the reformers, a return to the oppressive,
centralized regimes of the past is likely.
Whatever the future may bring to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, they will have a long road to reform. Whatever course is chosen,
the political and economic situations are likely to worsen. Furthermore, the
nationality issue will not be resolved if democratic reforms are not fully
implemented. Corbachev cannot hope to solve the problems in the USSR
by straddling socialism and democracy. Likewise, he cannot sit on the fence
with the nationalities issue. If he stays in power, he should either grant
secessionist republics their independence or work out some feasible
arrangement that will allow them more autonomy with an interdependent
relationship with the Soviet Union. If a cooperative arrangement could be
worked out among leaders from each republic, a solution to the crisis might
be found.

But given the animosity and hostility among republics and

between republics and the central government, this is a dim hope.

If

Gorbachev or a future leader totally sacrifices commitment to reform to
restore order and discipline in Soviet society, a bitter internal and external
dispute will surely follow.

Thus, as Gorbachev struggles to reform the

economy, maintain political stability, and ensure unity in his country, the
Soviet people are watching this huge former empire crumble around them.
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While some want to hasten its disintegration and others are striving to keep
it together, only one thing seems certain: the end result, whatever it may be,
will be tragic.
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